The chapter shits the focus to the social embedding of metacognition. It develops upon the concept of mindshaping: interactive practices, questioning, tutoring, correction, praise, sanction, through which communities regulate how individuals form, express, and defend beliefs. Because embodied noetic feelings are outwardly legible, they become targets for interpretation and discipline: confidence must be justified, doubt must be resolved or sustained for the right reasons. Through repeated cycles of challenge and response, agents internalize public standards and learn to treat beliefs as answerable to norms. The chapter argues that such embedded regulation is the developmental pathway from basic epistemic agency to high-level mindreading: understanding one’s own and others’ beliefs as beliefs that can be wrong, justified, corrected, or revised. Rather than mindreading explaining metacognition, the order of explanation inverts: socially scaffolded metacognition cultivates sophisticated mindreading. Evidence from child development, pedagogy, and cooperative problem-solving illustrates how accountability structures build justificatory competence. The result is a unified account: embodied signals supply the felt materials; embedding supplies the normative form; together they yield the capacities associated with a mature theory of mind.

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Embedded Metacognition and Mindshaping: From Epistemic Agency to High-Level Mindreading

  • John Dorsch

摘要

The chapter shits the focus to the social embedding of metacognition. It develops upon the concept of mindshaping: interactive practices, questioning, tutoring, correction, praise, sanction, through which communities regulate how individuals form, express, and defend beliefs. Because embodied noetic feelings are outwardly legible, they become targets for interpretation and discipline: confidence must be justified, doubt must be resolved or sustained for the right reasons. Through repeated cycles of challenge and response, agents internalize public standards and learn to treat beliefs as answerable to norms. The chapter argues that such embedded regulation is the developmental pathway from basic epistemic agency to high-level mindreading: understanding one’s own and others’ beliefs as beliefs that can be wrong, justified, corrected, or revised. Rather than mindreading explaining metacognition, the order of explanation inverts: socially scaffolded metacognition cultivates sophisticated mindreading. Evidence from child development, pedagogy, and cooperative problem-solving illustrates how accountability structures build justificatory competence. The result is a unified account: embodied signals supply the felt materials; embedding supplies the normative form; together they yield the capacities associated with a mature theory of mind.