This chapter develops the thesis that noetic feelings are not purely cortical computations but embodied phenomena arising from an intricate brain–body interface. Drawing on affective neuroscience and interoception, it argues that visceral, autonomic, and motor processes (e.g., cardiovascular arousal, respiratory rhythms, gut–brain signaling, postural readiness) supply salience, valence, and motivational force to feelings of confidence, doubt, and cognitive ease or strain. These bodily contributions explain both the phenomenology (why confidence feels like something) and the efficacy (why it moves cognition) of noetic feelings. On this view, the signals that guide monitoring and control are not merely subpersonal error terms but consciously accessible, affect-laden experiences that calibrate belief-updating and information search. The embodied account thereby resists cognitive triviality: it shows how the richness and action-readiness of noetic feelings derive from extracerebral dynamics that purely computational stories miss. It also sets up an answer to epistemic triviality: because embodied feelings are publicly legible (in voice, face, gesture, posture) and behavior-guiding, they are available for social interpretation and correction, preparing them to be woven into practices of giving and asking for reasons.

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Are Noetic Feelings Embodied? The Case for Embodied Metacognition

  • John Dorsch

摘要

This chapter develops the thesis that noetic feelings are not purely cortical computations but embodied phenomena arising from an intricate brain–body interface. Drawing on affective neuroscience and interoception, it argues that visceral, autonomic, and motor processes (e.g., cardiovascular arousal, respiratory rhythms, gut–brain signaling, postural readiness) supply salience, valence, and motivational force to feelings of confidence, doubt, and cognitive ease or strain. These bodily contributions explain both the phenomenology (why confidence feels like something) and the efficacy (why it moves cognition) of noetic feelings. On this view, the signals that guide monitoring and control are not merely subpersonal error terms but consciously accessible, affect-laden experiences that calibrate belief-updating and information search. The embodied account thereby resists cognitive triviality: it shows how the richness and action-readiness of noetic feelings derive from extracerebral dynamics that purely computational stories miss. It also sets up an answer to epistemic triviality: because embodied feelings are publicly legible (in voice, face, gesture, posture) and behavior-guiding, they are available for social interpretation and correction, preparing them to be woven into practices of giving and asking for reasons.