This chapter will introduce the normative inferentialist approach developed by Sellars and Brandom, which accounts for how the logical and normative space of reasons is constituted in discursive practices together with the mutual authorization of rational agents. This conception of rational agents can be fruitfully applied to attribute and license the normative status of non-human rational agents. As will be argued in this chapter, the space of reasons shared with humans allows rational agents to be characterized by their normative statuses instead of mental states. According to this approach, interpretable and responsible artificial rational agents do not mean turning the black box of inner operations into a glass box but rather placing the formation and performance of information processing procedures into the space of reasons. Because the conceptual framework of normative inferentialism elucidates how rational agents can make implicit commitments explicit in norm-making through the expressive role of linguistic structures. This conceptual framework will be employed to specifically reveal how information patterns formed through digital practices and processed by semantic technologies enable both human and artificial agents participating in digital social practices to undertake discursive commitments and achieve rational action.