This chapter argues that the most promising framework for integrating science into democratic decision-making is a “democratic authority model.” Building on the conceptual work of the previous chapter, this model conceives of scientific authority not as authority over private beliefs but as an authority to establish public facts for collective decision-making. The chapter first outlines Mark Warren’s general theory of democratic authority, which reconciles authority with autonomy by replacing the “surrender of judgment” with a “warranted suspension of judgment” enabled by a context of public criticism. It then develops Alfred Moore’s application of this theory to scientific expertise. Two central challenges are addressed: first, how to maintain authority over epistemic matters without demanding belief, which is resolved through a distinction between belief and acceptance; and second, how non-experts can exercise the critical judgment that democratic authority requires. While this second problem is partially addressed through procedural mechanisms like consensus-building and proxy assessments of expertise, the chapter concludes by identifying a critical limitation: these approaches still restrict public involvement to a non-epistemic level, failing to fully resolve the problem of substantive public judgment and setting the stage for the final chapter’s solution.