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Closed Condorcet domains not only preclude intransitivities in pairwise majority voting, they are also endowed with a large class of further aggregation rules satisfying Arrow’s independence condition.

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Arrovian Aggregation and Strategy-Proof Social Choice

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年

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  • Clemens Puppe,
  • Arkadii Slinko

摘要

Closed Condorcet domains not only preclude intransitivities in pairwise majority voting, they are also endowed with a large class of further aggregation rules satisfying Arrow’s independence condition.