This chapter argues that South Africa’s Arms Control System (SA ACS) sits at the intersection of international non-proliferation obligations and domestic economic and security imperatives. Anchored in a dense web of treaties and conventions, including the Arms Trade Treaty, Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention and the Wassenaar Arrangement, the SA ACS is intended to promote transparency, prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and regulate conventional and dual use arms in line with human rights and peace and security norms. Nationally, this regime is institutionalised through the National Conventional Arms Control Committee and the Directorate for Conventional Arms Control which administer licensing, oversight and reporting functions across the defence industrial ecosystem. Drawing on media reporting and expert interviews, the chapter shows how bureaucratic rigidity, governance failures and crises like the Lady R episode undermine the credibility of this ostensibly robust framework, constraining the South African defence sector’s developmental potential and eroding trust in South Africa’s “responsible” arms trade posture. It concludes that the SA ACS is structurally capable of being an enabler, but in practice often operates as a disabler, and proposes reforms in governance, transparency, collaboration and support to industry to realign arms control with economic development and national security.

错误:搜索内容不能为空,请输入英文关键词
错误:关键词超出字数限制,请精简
高级检索

South African Arms Control: An Enabler or Disabler for the Defence Sector?

  • Dries Putter

摘要

This chapter argues that South Africa’s Arms Control System (SA ACS) sits at the intersection of international non-proliferation obligations and domestic economic and security imperatives. Anchored in a dense web of treaties and conventions, including the Arms Trade Treaty, Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention and the Wassenaar Arrangement, the SA ACS is intended to promote transparency, prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and regulate conventional and dual use arms in line with human rights and peace and security norms. Nationally, this regime is institutionalised through the National Conventional Arms Control Committee and the Directorate for Conventional Arms Control which administer licensing, oversight and reporting functions across the defence industrial ecosystem. Drawing on media reporting and expert interviews, the chapter shows how bureaucratic rigidity, governance failures and crises like the Lady R episode undermine the credibility of this ostensibly robust framework, constraining the South African defence sector’s developmental potential and eroding trust in South Africa’s “responsible” arms trade posture. It concludes that the SA ACS is structurally capable of being an enabler, but in practice often operates as a disabler, and proposes reforms in governance, transparency, collaboration and support to industry to realign arms control with economic development and national security.