This chapter consolidates the book’s overarching argument: (A) arguments for permissible killing (pk) suffer serious de jure defects, while arguments for impermissible killing (~pk) incur trivial or much less serious de jure defects; (B) if the moral risk of being wrong in acting on (pk) is greater than acting on (~pk), and (pk)’s justifications are more defective, then one should not act as if (pk) is permissible; (C) the moral risk in being wrong about (pk) is indeed greater. The principal aim of the chapter is to argue for premises (B) and (C). The chapter explains how moral risk raises the bar of justification for action, using examples like the “bank case” and several others. Crucially, the chapter establishes that there is an asymmetry of moral risk: all disputants agree that unjustly killing persons is a grave harm, a moral cost far exceeding any infringement on liberty interests. Arguments suggesting that the moral risk falls on (~pk) (e.g., Guererro, Kaposy, Thomson) are canvassed and dismissed as circular. The conclusion is not that (pk) is false or should not be believed, but that given the comparative severity of de jure defects and the asymmetry of moral risk, one is not justified in acting as if (pk) is permissible.