Euthanasia, Suffering, and Care
摘要
This chapter presents arguments against the permissibility of killing in the context of euthanasia (~pk). The chapter focuses on two main approaches: the dignity argument and the argument from love and caring. The dignity argument posits that all human persons possess intrinsic and irreplaceable dignity that does not diminish with suffering or disability. Intentionally killing an innocent person violates their inherent worth. This inherent worth is illuminated through reflections on emotions like remorse, grief, and love, which reveal the unique and precious value of individuals. The argument from love and caring centers on the virtues of clinicians, asserting that true love (willing the good of the other) is nontransferable, resilient, and non-fragile. Dignity therapy is presented as a clinical manifestation of this kind of love, aiming to restore a patient’s sense of worth and meaning even in profound suffering. Dignity therapy, it is argued, is incompatible with the intention to kill. The chapter addresses potential de jure defects for these ~pk arguments such as different value perceptions or peer disagreement. It is argued that such defects are weak compared to the more severe structural flaws (e.g., circularity, inference defects) found in arguments for (pk).