This chapter analyzes arguments for the permissibility of killing (pk) in the context of euthanasia. The chapter focused primarily on arguments from patient autonomy and the desire to avoid intractable suffering, the latter of which rests on the claim that death can be a benefit. The chapter begins by exploring the historical antecedents to arguments for the permissibility of euthanasia. It identifies several de jure defects. The distinction between “biological life” and “biographical life” is criticized as artificially narrow and for committing an inference defect by presuming biological life has no intrinsic value, and also for implicitly leading to a body-self dualism that undermines bodily rights. The role of consent is challenged, arguing that it doesn’t automatically transform impermissible killing into mercy. The claim that “death is a benefit” is also deemed defective as it assumes that death is not a harm. Finally, the argument for (pk) suffers from the groundless objection, as it cannot non-circularly distinguish between permissible euthanasia for terminally ill patients and impermissible killing for other suffering individuals (e.g., POWs, depressed teenagers). Overall, the chapter concludes that arguments for euthanasia are plagued by serious structural de jure defects.