This chapter introduces a pro-life argument (~pk) against abortion, centered on the concept of Transworld Identity (TWI). The argument draws on actual abortion survivor testimonies, such as Sarah Smith’s, who can truthfully assert, “I was almost killed”. This statement implies that “Sarah” (a person) existed in a possible world where the abortion succeeded, and thus, a person would have been killed. The chapter argues that this modal argument extends the intuitive force of prenatal harm cases, which are generally accepted by proponents of permissible killing (pk). It confronts two main objections: first, that it assumes killing persons is wrong, which is addressed as a weak defect due to a misplaced burden of proof. The inherent wrongness of killing persons is generally accepted for born individuals. Second, the objection that psychological theories of personhood invalidate the survivor’s claim is rebutted by referencing Chap. 4 ’s argument for the underdetermination and such a claim must contend with the too-many thinkers problem. Ultimately, the chapter concludes that the arguments for ~(pk) suffer much less serious de jure defects compared to those for (pk).

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The Modal Argument Against Abortion

  • Stephen Napier

摘要

This chapter introduces a pro-life argument (~pk) against abortion, centered on the concept of Transworld Identity (TWI). The argument draws on actual abortion survivor testimonies, such as Sarah Smith’s, who can truthfully assert, “I was almost killed”. This statement implies that “Sarah” (a person) existed in a possible world where the abortion succeeded, and thus, a person would have been killed. The chapter argues that this modal argument extends the intuitive force of prenatal harm cases, which are generally accepted by proponents of permissible killing (pk). It confronts two main objections: first, that it assumes killing persons is wrong, which is addressed as a weak defect due to a misplaced burden of proof. The inherent wrongness of killing persons is generally accepted for born individuals. Second, the objection that psychological theories of personhood invalidate the survivor’s claim is rebutted by referencing Chap. 4 ’s argument for the underdetermination and such a claim must contend with the too-many thinkers problem. Ultimately, the chapter concludes that the arguments for ~(pk) suffer much less serious de jure defects compared to those for (pk).