This chapter critically examines arguments for the permissibility of abortion that presume that what is killed is one of us. Even though what is killed is one of us, they argue that when abortions are typically done we may be permissibly killed. There are two main arguments for consideration: those that focus on interests, and those that focus on bodily rights. The chapter begins by defining abortion, and then turns to the time-relative interest account (TRIA) of harm or wrongdoing. The TRIA posits that harm requires the frustration of a being’s time-relative interests, which are contingent on consciousness or sentience. Thus, preconscious human beings, lacking such capacities, cannot be harmed. However, the chapter considers impairment arguments (e.g., prenatal drug abuse, neuronal removal), where preconscious beings are intuitively harmed. TRIA proponents respond with either the “Experience Condition” (no harm if not experienced) or “Content Specification” (only select interests count). The chapter argues that the “Experience Condition” response is viciously circular, as it assumes the permissibility of killing. This circularity is identified as a severe de jure defect, rendering the TRIA justification for abortion unable to create independent reasons for an uncommitted audience. The chapter considers at length bodily rights arguments. It argues among other conclusions, that when bodily rights considerations are applied to the developing human being, we get an argument against abortion not for it. Bodily rights arguments lack coherence.