This chapter situates the outlook developed in the book through a critical discussion of three other influential varieties of second-personal ethics: 1. the subject-subject relation in the post-Kantian transcendental philosophy of Fichte and, more recently, Darwall, revolving around concepts such as recognition, respect, and duty; 2. The subject-subject relation in transcendental phenomenology with its Husserlian framework developed into an ethics of empathy by Edith Stein (and currently championed by Zahavi); 3. The Same-Other relation in Lévinas’s post-phenomenological ethics of the encounter in which the motifs of the Face and of being-for-the-other are central.

错误:搜索内容不能为空,请输入英文关键词
错误:关键词超出字数限制,请精简
高级检索

The Second-Person Relation in Philosophy

  • Philip Strammer

摘要

This chapter situates the outlook developed in the book through a critical discussion of three other influential varieties of second-personal ethics: 1. the subject-subject relation in the post-Kantian transcendental philosophy of Fichte and, more recently, Darwall, revolving around concepts such as recognition, respect, and duty; 2. The subject-subject relation in transcendental phenomenology with its Husserlian framework developed into an ethics of empathy by Edith Stein (and currently championed by Zahavi); 3. The Same-Other relation in Lévinas’s post-phenomenological ethics of the encounter in which the motifs of the Face and of being-for-the-other are central.