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This introduction propounds the book’s central effort of developing the foundations of a reconceptualisation of morality built around the second-person, or I-You, relation. The chapter’s first section shows that such a reconceptualisation is called for because of the widespread tendency in philosophy to theorise morality in first- and third-personal terms while neglecting the second-person perspective—a neglect that is itself morally problematic because depersonalising. In the second section, this depersonalising trend is illustrated with recourse to two of the most influential moral thinkers, Aristotle and Immanuel Kant.

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The First, Second, and Third Person in Moral Philosophy

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年

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  • Philip Strammer

摘要

This introduction propounds the book’s central effort of developing the foundations of a reconceptualisation of morality built around the second-person, or I-You, relation. The chapter’s first section shows that such a reconceptualisation is called for because of the widespread tendency in philosophy to theorise morality in first- and third-personal terms while neglecting the second-person perspective—a neglect that is itself morally problematic because depersonalising. In the second section, this depersonalising trend is illustrated with recourse to two of the most influential moral thinkers, Aristotle and Immanuel Kant.