The Soviet launch of Sputnik in October 1957 marked the beginning of a period of significant change for the US Air Force. Until then, it had held the premier position in terms of the US nuclear deterrent mission relative to the other military services because of Strategic Air Command’s oversight of the US nuclear arsenal. New technologies with new means of delivery, namely, the Navy’s sea-launched Polaris missile programme that was accelerated in the aftermath of Sputnik, threatened to topple the Air Force from its perch. In 1959, the Air Force initiated the Skybolt missile programme to compete with Polaris. Skybolt was planned as a delivery vehicle that could be launched from a variety of mobile air platforms including Britain’s V-bombers. Its impending cancellation, however, precipitated a crisis in the so-called Anglo-American ‘special relationship’. This chapter augments the existing narratives of the Skybolt crisis by examining the programme during its initial phase of development. The US Air Force perspective, the interservice rivalry, and the bureaucratic battles in the US government over the future of the nuclear deterrent in the context of the ill-fated missile programme are highlighted, providing crucial new insights into the diplomatic crisis between London and Washington that eventually unfolded in late1962.