This chapter examines judicial and prosecutorial capture as a central domain where competing informal institutions are embedded and exercised, enabling incumbents in Hungary and Macedonia to weaken horizontal accountability and sustain competitive authoritarian rule. Control over the legal system functioned both as a shield for ruling elites and as an instrument to constrain or punish opponents. In Hungary, Fidesz used its constitutional supermajority after 2010 to restructure the judiciary through the National Judicial Office, concentrating authority over appointments, case allocation, and administration in partisan hands. Additional reforms lowered the retirement age to remove senior judges, expanded the Constitutional Court with loyal appointees, and curtailed its jurisdiction, limiting review of government actions. In Macedonia, the VMRO-DPMNE–DUI government did not pursue constitutional overhaul but incrementally politicized appointments, subordinated oversight bodies, and engaged in selective enforcement. The State Public Prosecutor’s Office increasingly aligned with ruling-party interests, avoiding corruption cases while pursuing political opponents. In both countries, legal changes were complemented by informal practices, including patronage networks, pressures on judges, and strategic case allocation. Judicial subordination reinforced the single-pyramid system of power, paving the way for electoral manipulation that further entrenched incumbents.