This chapter defines artificial humanoids and contrasts them with other robotic and AI systems. It includes a typology of robots and introduces the idea of hyperrealistic, autonomous robots with human-like features and behaviour. Eight morally significant features of future humanoids are examined: (1) human-like appearance, (2) autonomy, (3) intelligence, (4) self-awareness, (5) self-learning capacities, (6) moral reasoning, (7) general world knowledge, and (8) potential sentience. The chapter considers the implications of these features for moral status and begins to question the instrumental view of robots as mere tools. A case is made for moving towards more inclusive forms of moral recognition. A case study of Anthropic’s Claude Opus 4Claude Opus 4 examines flickers of instrumental self-preservation, preference expression, and self-referential discourse, arguing for precautionary “soft-welfarewelfare” norms while stopping short of personhoodpersonhood claims. The chapter considers whether and how appearance shapes moral intuitions and interaction without treating it as ontologically decisive. It closes by forecasting a shift from tool-use to relationships of shared responsibility as capacities scale, and by posing design-led questions about engineering systems that may come to merit graduated recognitionrecognition.