In this chapter, Stefan Fröhlich discusses the effects that a changing US role in the world will have on Europe. In a domestically polarized political landscape throughout Europe, he argues, there will be limited ability to reconstruct the edifice of the post-Cold War liberal international order—the experience of the Biden administration demonstrates that even an administration that explicitly promised to restore America’s standing in the world was unable to unwind measures like tariffs and was not rewarded politically for those steps it did execute such as the strengthening of US alliances in Europe and East Asia. In the case of Europe, it will need a more “Martian” moment—borrowing Kagan’s term in his early 2000s essay—to even come close to replacing the United States within the next decade. There is no alternative to a serious commitment to defend against and counter Russia’s aggression even without the United States; building an independent European (not necessarily EU) capacity to counter geo-economic warfare and overcome Europe’s structural dependencies on third countries for new critical resources; and consistent efforts to find coordinated responses to global challenges with the United States, following the logic of “hoping for the best, preparing for the worst.”

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Present at the Disarray: How Can Europe Adjust to a Changing World Order and Trump’s “America First”

  • Stefan Fröhlich,
  • Jackson Janes,
  • Jeffrey Rathke

摘要

In this chapter, Stefan Fröhlich discusses the effects that a changing US role in the world will have on Europe. In a domestically polarized political landscape throughout Europe, he argues, there will be limited ability to reconstruct the edifice of the post-Cold War liberal international order—the experience of the Biden administration demonstrates that even an administration that explicitly promised to restore America’s standing in the world was unable to unwind measures like tariffs and was not rewarded politically for those steps it did execute such as the strengthening of US alliances in Europe and East Asia. In the case of Europe, it will need a more “Martian” moment—borrowing Kagan’s term in his early 2000s essay—to even come close to replacing the United States within the next decade. There is no alternative to a serious commitment to defend against and counter Russia’s aggression even without the United States; building an independent European (not necessarily EU) capacity to counter geo-economic warfare and overcome Europe’s structural dependencies on third countries for new critical resources; and consistent efforts to find coordinated responses to global challenges with the United States, following the logic of “hoping for the best, preparing for the worst.”