Now that the Kuhnian scholarship has clarified that Kuhn’s philosophy does not support externalist, constructionist, or even irrationalist images of science, a new worry is starting to loom large. Some argue, in fact, that Kuhn may be read as a supporter, or even a promoter, of the so-called Value-Free Ideal (VFI), which many contemporary philosophers of science find untenable. Other philosophers, however, interpret Kuhn in the opposite direction, that is as a supporting the idea that non-epistemic values are necessary to science. This chapter aims at clarifying the place of Kuhn’s philosophy within the contemporary debate about values in science. After defining VFI, I will discuss the ‘Value-Free Kuhn’ interpretations which, as I will argue, are based on some misunderstandings about some fundamental elements of Kuhn’s philosophy. Furthermore, I will argue that the issue of values in science must be disentangled from the issue of the political autonomy of science, and that Kuhn’s approach shows how this is so. Finally, I suggest how Kuhn’s philosophy may help us reconsider some aspects of the debate on values in science, as well as some issues concerning the science/society relationship.