Rather than with an analysis of some of the most talked about concepts of SSR, such as incommensurability or scientific revolutions, in this book I began with an analysis of Kuhn’s general philosophical perspective, which he developed as a remedy to some of the difficulties of the static perspective. From the rejection of the unwarranted presupposition concerning the accessibility of an absolute and neutral basis for scientific evaluation, the dynamic perspective unfolds through ‘Socratic juxtaposition’ to the static perspective. Kuhn did not draw his dynamic perspective from the study of the history of science. Rather, he studied the history of science because of his philosophical perspective on science. Based on the history of science, he then developed a descriptive-normative account of the progress of science through periods of normal science and revolutions. Such an account can be adjusted, challenged, or even rejected by new or better historical evidence. The dynamic perspective per se, however, cannot can be challenged only by philosophical arguments. It may however bring more clarity on the often-discussed history-based model of science, that Kuhn sketched in QPT, developed in SSR and then adjusted in many post-SSR writings.