In their 1975 study Military Government and Political Development: Lessons from Peru, Kevin J. Middlebrook and David Scott Palmer examined the Peruvian military’s role in political and social reform after the 1968 coup. They highlighted how the military government’s corporatist model aimed to channel citizen participation through controlled structures, but it faltered due to persistent independent organizations such as unions. Despite efforts including nationalization, agrarian reform, and appeals to the country’s indigenous community, the armed forces could not fully suppress or co-opt civil society. These insights resonate today as Latin American democracies face increasing militarization. Mexico under President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018–2024) illustrates this trend. His administration relied heavily on the military to implement the Fourth Transformation, expanding the armed forces’ role into civilian spheres—public security, infrastructure, and citizen welfare—far beyond their constitutional mandate. The military’s budget, size, and autonomy surged, reinforcing the president’s centralizing project. Yet as in Peru, corruption, waning accountability, and malfeasance have plagued the military in their performance of traditional and emerging duties. This chapter argues that the empowerment of the Mexican military as an agent of political and societal change has occurred at the expense of participatory democracy, not in concert with it. But unlike in Peru, civilian leaders’ exaltation and defense of the Mexican military tampered the public’s criticisms of its growing influence, all but assuring an institutionalized role for the armed forces in development and governance work beyond López Obrador’s tenure in office.