This chapter grounds the model in ethics. Drawing on Arendt’s right to appear, Butler’s grievability, and Freire’s humanisation, I argue that many people with co-emergent distress are denied recognition as full moral subjects. I set out an ethics of layered recognition that moves beyond deservingness to dignity-first practice: safeguarding without punishment, agency without abandonment, and care that refuses to trade humanity for efficiency. Ethical practice, I suggest, is not an add-on; it is the conditions under which any intervention can be just, humane, and effective.

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Ethics: Dignity, Agency, and Justice

  • Simon Bratt

摘要

This chapter grounds the model in ethics. Drawing on Arendt’s right to appear, Butler’s grievability, and Freire’s humanisation, I argue that many people with co-emergent distress are denied recognition as full moral subjects. I set out an ethics of layered recognition that moves beyond deservingness to dignity-first practice: safeguarding without punishment, agency without abandonment, and care that refuses to trade humanity for efficiency. Ethical practice, I suggest, is not an add-on; it is the conditions under which any intervention can be just, humane, and effective.