I examine Raymond Tallis’s objections to (primarily Russellian) panpsychism, focusing on three key arguments: the subject combination problem, the epistemic challenge of knowing through 'amming', and the alleged ontological gap between intransitive micro-consciousness and transitive human consciousness. I argue that, while Tallis raises important concerns, none of his objections decisively undermine panpsychism. In response, I defend a version of the phenomenal transparency thesis, reject Tallis’s restrictive account of knowledge, and explore panpsychist proposals that can potentially account for subject combination, such as phenomenal bonding, cosmopsychism, and my own monadic panpsychism. I also clarify the conceptual distinction, as most clearly articulated by Michael Tye, between consciousness-as-such and representational content, showing how it helps dissolve the supposed intransitivity problem. Throughout the chapter, I aim to demonstrate that panpsychism, particularly in certain formulations, retains significant philosophical plausibility and that Tallis’s critique, while very thorough, ultimately leaves the panpsychist with several coherent and defensible options.