Over the last decade, we have seen more attention devoted to both values and emotions in institutional theory. These foci, however, have largely been through separate streams of literature—where we see values work in contrast or distinct from emotion work. Indeed, while there is overlap, those theorizing values in institutions have generally not been in direct conversation with those theorizing emotions. We argue in this chapter that the separation of values and emotions can build our understanding of these discrete concepts but potentially undermines more general progress in our study of logics. We argue that disentangling values and emotions may be more complicated than currently discussed and furthermore propose a view that studies their entanglements more directly. Thus, in this chapter we seek to discuss the intricate embeddedness of values, emotions, and logics. To do so, we draw on the work of Nussbaum and Feldman Barrett to articulate novel theorizing about these interdependencies. We hope highlighting these complex interdependencies will trigger future research on the model we outline.