This chapter examines the nature and implications of political connections among industrial and holding companies listed on the London Stock Exchange between 2000 and 2012. Situated within the UK’s historically rooted parliamentary democracy and distinct market-driven economy, the study defines political connections as instances where top corporate officers or large shareholders simultaneously held positions in the House of Commons or the House of Lords. Drawing on an original dataset of 330 continuously listed companies, the analysis identifies six distinct types of political ties and evaluates their impact on corporate leverage, profitability, efficiency, and market power. The findings suggest that political connections—particularly through board appointments and the House of Lords—are associated with greater access to credit and increased market capitalization, but also with reduced operational efficiency and profitability. Connections through large shareholders and the House of Commons exhibit a different pattern, particularly influencing leverage. The chapter highlights that while politically connected firms constitute a minority, they account for a disproportionately large share of market capitalization. This evidence reflects the strategic value of political ties in the UK corporate context, while also revealing their potential costs in terms of firm performance.

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The Case of United Kingdom

  • Carlo Bellavite Pellegrini,
  • Laura Pellegrini,
  • Andrea Roncella

摘要

This chapter examines the nature and implications of political connections among industrial and holding companies listed on the London Stock Exchange between 2000 and 2012. Situated within the UK’s historically rooted parliamentary democracy and distinct market-driven economy, the study defines political connections as instances where top corporate officers or large shareholders simultaneously held positions in the House of Commons or the House of Lords. Drawing on an original dataset of 330 continuously listed companies, the analysis identifies six distinct types of political ties and evaluates their impact on corporate leverage, profitability, efficiency, and market power. The findings suggest that political connections—particularly through board appointments and the House of Lords—are associated with greater access to credit and increased market capitalization, but also with reduced operational efficiency and profitability. Connections through large shareholders and the House of Commons exhibit a different pattern, particularly influencing leverage. The chapter highlights that while politically connected firms constitute a minority, they account for a disproportionately large share of market capitalization. This evidence reflects the strategic value of political ties in the UK corporate context, while also revealing their potential costs in terms of firm performance.