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We initiate a systematic study of information-theoretic cryptography with weak privacy, only requiring that the adversary cannot rule out any possible secret. For a parameter $$0<p_le _="" we="" say="" that="" a="" primitive="" has="" p-weak="" privacy="" _p-WP_="" if="" for="" every="" possible="" view="" V="" and="" inputs="" _x_1_x_2_="" the="" ratio="" between="" probabilities="" of="" adversary="" observing="" on="" _x_1_="" _x_2_="" is="" at="" least="" p.="" This="" generalizes="" both="" perfect="" privacy_="" which="" p-WP="" _p="1$$" previous="" _combinatorial_="" notion="" some="">0$$ . We obtain the following main results. </p_le>

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Cryptography with Weak Privacy

  • 会议论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年

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  • Amos Beimel,
  • Yuval Ishai,
  • Eyal Kushilevitz,
  • Hanjun Li

摘要

We initiate a systematic study of information-theoretic cryptography with weak privacy, only requiring that the adversary cannot rule out any possible secret. For a parameter $$00$$ . We obtain the following main results.