The relationship between schizophrenia and metaphorical expression is a pivotal one for phenomenology, as it provides insight into both the nature of the schizophrenic experience as well underlying and fundamental structures of human meaning-making and language. In what follows, I will explore how alterations in metaphorical understanding and expression in schizophrenia illuminate broader questions about consciousness, intersubjectivity, and the lived experience of schizophrenia. Starting from the role played by embodied semantics, a neuroscientific theory that describes how the brain processes meaning and how word comprehension is intrinsically linked to sensory-motor experiences, I argue that what is left out is the lived body, known in phenomenology as the Leib. In accounts such as these, what remains is only the biological body, which becomes reduced to those sensory-motor capacities that influence specific brain regions and networks. Correspondingly, our ability to speak and use metaphors is itself reduced to a mere brain activity. In contrast to this perspective, I offer a phenomenologically grounded reading to address the relationship between our lived body and living subjectivity. Drawing upon theoretical resources from Minkowski, Binswanger, Jaspers, and Blankenburg, my aim is to show how metaphorical disturbance must be understood not as a mere linguistic impairment but as an opening onto the radical restructuring of consciousness itself, a transformation that reveals the distinctive mode of being-in-the-world proper to schizophrenic experience.