This chapter examines why consequentialism, despite its practical appeal to clinicians, is particularly vulnerable to adult-normative bias. Because consequentialist theories locate personal value in an individual’s capacity to participate in a desirable outcome—whether pleasure, preference satisfaction or rational autonomy—they risk reducing the moral importance of persons to zero whenever those capacities are absent. The result is a systematic tendency towards false negatives: accurate in identifying value where it exists, but alarmingly confident in asserting that value is absent on grounds that are, in reality, arbitrary. Classical utilitarian accounts, from Bentham through contemporary bioethicists such as Tooley, Singer and Giubilini, illustrate the danger that this poses to children. Each presupposes that meaningful existence must resemble adult existence; childness is therefore treated as a temporary deficiency rather than a distinct way of flourishing. When paired with a reductive account of the desirable outcome, this bias licenses claims that some infants lack a right to life at all. The chapter argues that consequentialism’s dangers arise not from its structure but from its narrow objectives. Consequentialist reasoning is valuable but must be critically divested of adult-normative assumptions. A sound consequentialist bioethic must resist the erasure of childness and adopt an account of flourishing broad enough to capture the infant’s capacities.