This chapter argues that the difficulty moral philosophy faces in valuing infants does not stem merely from historical ignorance of their cognitive capacities. Even now, despite rich empirical evidence demonstrating that infants possess sophisticated ways of apprehending the world, many contemporary theorists continue to discount childness, privileging instead the modes of thought characteristic of adults. The persistence of this asymmetry, the chapter suggests, reveals a deeper epistemic problem: an entrenched adult-normativity that determines in advance which capacities should ‘count’ towards personal value. Drawing on analogies with medical devices, the chapter shows how tools calibrated to adult norms can mismeasure or misrecognise children, yielding results that appear plausible yet are systematically wrong. Adult-normative reasoning functions similarly: it covertly installs adulthood as the evaluative ideal, rendering the infant simultaneously normal and deficient, and foreclosing genuine moral analysis. The chapter challenges the assumption that development represents progress toward a superior state. Infants’ lantern-like awareness, openness to information and effortless relationality may be no less valuable—and in some respects more epistemically virtuous—than adult cognition. To evaluate children properly, ethics must cease orbiting adultness and be reorientated around a rational, evidence-based anthropology of childness itself.