Scholarlink

Certain security guarantees pertaining to power system automation communications based on the IEC 61850 series of standards can be provided by employing mechanisms in the IEC 62351 standard. However, total correctness and, thus, the safety of protocol semantics cannot be guaranteed without message delivery guarantees. This chapter presents an applied \(\pi \) -calculus model that describes process and bay level communications in the IEC 61850 framework with a focus on sampled value and Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) messages with explicit representations of topology using a formal grammar. The model supports reasoning about attacks, especially related to communications channel properties. Selected attack modes are specified and proofs of the feasibility/infeasibility of denial-of-service and change-in-causality attacks are provided.

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Topology-Sensitive Attacks on Electric Power System Communications

  • 会议论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年

查看全文
  • Arzhan Tong,
  • Stephen Wolthusen

摘要

Certain security guarantees pertaining to power system automation communications based on the IEC 61850 series of standards can be provided by employing mechanisms in the IEC 62351 standard. However, total correctness and, thus, the safety of protocol semantics cannot be guaranteed without message delivery guarantees. This chapter presents an applied \(\pi \) -calculus model that describes process and bay level communications in the IEC 61850 framework with a focus on sampled value and Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) messages with explicit representations of topology using a formal grammar. The model supports reasoning about attacks, especially related to communications channel properties. Selected attack modes are specified and proofs of the feasibility/infeasibility of denial-of-service and change-in-causality attacks are provided.