This article analyses the evolution of Russia’s intervention strategies through key operations from Czechoslovakia (1968) to Ukraine (2022). It reveals a repeated operational framework that has become doctrinal, despite its absence in Russian military exercises, field manuals and theoretical literature. This pattern has remained largely unrecognised in Western analyses, at times even leading to misinterpretations of Russian actions as irrational. The findings suggest that the ‘unorthodox’ invasion model is deeply rooted in political control and orchestration. It relies on airborne and special operations forces, covert activities and, more recently, political operations directed primarily by the intelligence agencies; however, this political dimension has been notably overshadowed in Ukraine. From the Russian perspective, the term ‘special military operation’ is justified; however, for Western audiences, this article defines it as a military-political operation. The article argues that a full understanding of both non-military and military actions, as well as the Russian top leadership’s way of thinking, helps to anticipate and assess future Russian aggression more effectively. Finally, the article presents solutions aimed at improving the accuracy of predictions concerning Russian actions. Until Russia restores its military capabilities, situations enabling Russian empowerment through non-military measures remain attractive to its leadership.

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From Prague to Kyiv: Understanding Russia’s Invasion Playbook and Why We Missed It

  • Pekka J. Turunen

摘要

This article analyses the evolution of Russia’s intervention strategies through key operations from Czechoslovakia (1968) to Ukraine (2022). It reveals a repeated operational framework that has become doctrinal, despite its absence in Russian military exercises, field manuals and theoretical literature. This pattern has remained largely unrecognised in Western analyses, at times even leading to misinterpretations of Russian actions as irrational. The findings suggest that the ‘unorthodox’ invasion model is deeply rooted in political control and orchestration. It relies on airborne and special operations forces, covert activities and, more recently, political operations directed primarily by the intelligence agencies; however, this political dimension has been notably overshadowed in Ukraine. From the Russian perspective, the term ‘special military operation’ is justified; however, for Western audiences, this article defines it as a military-political operation. The article argues that a full understanding of both non-military and military actions, as well as the Russian top leadership’s way of thinking, helps to anticipate and assess future Russian aggression more effectively. Finally, the article presents solutions aimed at improving the accuracy of predictions concerning Russian actions. Until Russia restores its military capabilities, situations enabling Russian empowerment through non-military measures remain attractive to its leadership.