This chapter discusses the lack of durable institutionalized political resources by Argentine agricultural producers and the sources of their failure in building them despite the price boom. In the arena of interest representation, the main gremial associations were organizationally weak and fragmented; while “technical” associations had expertise and resources but eschewed partisan engagement and internalized value-chain conflicts, diluting producers’ agenda. In the electoral arena, closed-list PR, the dominance of the Peronist camp (e.g., Frente para la Victoria), and fiscally centralized federalism foreclosed legislative and subnational access points for agricultural interests. Descriptive evidence and multivariate models for the 2005–2013 period show a short-lived 2009 surge of “agro-deputies,” concentrated outside core provinces; thereafter, representation reverted to near zero. At the provincial level, manufacturing employment and population (as proxy for a developed urban economy) strongly depressed the election of sectoral deputies, while agricultural output (soy/AGGP) raises it chiefly in peripheral provinces with small congressional delegations. Executive strategies—including segmented export-tax proposals and broad consultation (PEA 2010–2020)—further neutralized mobilization. The net result is that distributive conflict was channeled through episodic contentious mobilization rather than stable parliamentary influence, and protest neither translated into lasting institutional power nor succeded at reversing export taxes.