This concluding chapter recapitulates the book’s four central arguments, claiming that a nominalist reinterpretation of “ideology” and “alienation of labor” underwrites a deflationary, anti-philosophical conception of critique in which contradiction is contradiction of something with itself, and critique consists in making such contradictions explicit rather than opposing capitalist relations to external or internal norms. It then addresses the “problem of justification”, arguing that once practical philosophy is rejected, Marx can only make sense of the need to overcome capitalism in terms of historically situated interests, needs, and desires, so that communist appeals acquire a performative, rhetorical rather than philosophically grounded normative force, without thereby fully resolving the aporia of justification. Subsequently, the chapter distinguishes "immanent critique of practical philosophy" from a “historical critique of practical philosophy”, insisting that any immanent critique presupposes the specific historicity of its object and developing a “negative conception of normativity”. Finally, it introduces the notion of a “double young Marx”, contrasting an “esoteric” Marx oriented by a genitive-objective reading of “alienation of labor” and its anti-philosophical implications with an “exoteric” Marx compatible with the grounding strategies of practical philosophy. I believe that contemporary critical theory needs to retrieve the anti-philosophical lessons of the former.

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Conclusion

  • Felipe Taufer

摘要

  This concluding chapter recapitulates the book’s four central arguments, claiming that a nominalist reinterpretation of “ideology” and “alienation of labor” underwrites a deflationary, anti-philosophical conception of critique in which contradiction is contradiction of something with itself, and critique consists in making such contradictions explicit rather than opposing capitalist relations to external or internal norms. It then addresses the “problem of justification”, arguing that once practical philosophy is rejected, Marx can only make sense of the need to overcome capitalism in terms of historically situated interests, needs, and desires, so that communist appeals acquire a performative, rhetorical rather than philosophically grounded normative force, without thereby fully resolving the aporia of justification. Subsequently, the chapter distinguishes "immanent critique of practical philosophy" from a “historical critique of practical philosophy”, insisting that any immanent critique presupposes the specific historicity of its object and developing a “negative conception of normativity”. Finally, it introduces the notion of a “double young Marx”, contrasting an “esoteric” Marx oriented by a genitive-objective reading of “alienation of labor” and its anti-philosophical implications with an “exoteric” Marx compatible with the grounding strategies of practical philosophy. I believe that contemporary critical theory needs to retrieve the anti-philosophical lessons of the former.