This chapter delves into the interaction between the theory of private property and its concrete application. The goal of this chapter is to explain an apparent inconsistency between Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and his earlier Jena writings. In the Philosophy of Right, the property class is identified as the first social estate (Rph par. 203) rather than the second. My argument develops in two steps: first, I show how the first social estate in the Philosophy of Right is seen as twofold, comprising two social strata at opposite ends of society: peasantry and feudal aristocracy. As the vast majority of the population, peasants actually work the land; while landowners, according to the Majoratsrecht, possess customary rights (which cannot be considered rights in the proper sense, let alone property rights) on the same lands that peasants work on. I thereby argue that the property class to which Hegel refers in Rph par. 203 is only the non-aristocratic part of the first social estate, namely, the peasantry. Second, in reference to par. 217 of the Philosophy of Right, I point out that in the “mobile side” [bewegliche Seite] of civil society, that is, among members of the second social estate, property is not given in its simple form, as it is with peasants. In the second social estate, property is an abstract right established through contracts. In the third part of the chapter, I investigate the implications of the seemingly technical and ambiguous difference between property owned as simple property by peasants and property exchanged by contract within the second social estate. Based on the complexity of one’s interaction with economic and legal categories and institutions (courts, guilds, etc.), Hegel measures what he calls the degree of interdependence of the economic and social activity. I then point out that, according to Hegel, the greater this degree of interdependence, the greater the possibility of social and political Bildung. Based on the different relationships to property of the peasantry and the second class, I argue that Hegel justifies the exclusion of the peasantry from social and political life, while legitimising the political life of the second class through corporations and the other institutions of civil society.