This chapter provides a systematic exegesis of the paragraphs devoted to the introduction to abstract right and private property in the Philosophy of Right (mainly paragraphs 34–70). Starting from the observation that property plays an important role in the transition from feudal monarchy to the modern State, I analyse some fundamental passages of abstract right, seeking to show their links with the contemporary debate and their relevance to the theoretical choices made by Hegel. I also show how the deduction of the categories concerning abstract right and private property, despite their abstract nature, constitutes a progressive objectification of abstract freedom in a path from the inside to the outside of the person. First, I analyse the elements of abstract right, in particular the concepts of abstract person, legal capacity and Rechtsgebot. Second, I focus on the distinction that Hegel introduces between persons and things as a fundamental relationship of legal capacity. Thirdly, I deal with the relationship between the person and the first and most immediate object in which their will and legal capacity are objectified: their body. Fourthly, I address the issue of Besitzergreifung: I investigate what one actually possesses when one comes into possession of a thing. Fifthly, I deal with the problem of Besitznahme, that is, how it is possible to come into possession of something.

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Philosophy of Right II. The Theory of Private Property in Abstract Right

  • Matteo Rategni

摘要

This chapter provides a systematic exegesis of the paragraphs devoted to the introduction to abstract right and private property in the Philosophy of Right (mainly paragraphs 34–70). Starting from the observation that property plays an important role in the transition from feudal monarchy to the modern State, I analyse some fundamental passages of abstract right, seeking to show their links with the contemporary debate and their relevance to the theoretical choices made by Hegel. I also show how the deduction of the categories concerning abstract right and private property, despite their abstract nature, constitutes a progressive objectification of abstract freedom in a path from the inside to the outside of the person. First, I analyse the elements of abstract right, in particular the concepts of abstract person, legal capacity and Rechtsgebot. Second, I focus on the distinction that Hegel introduces between persons and things as a fundamental relationship of legal capacity. Thirdly, I deal with the relationship between the person and the first and most immediate object in which their will and legal capacity are objectified: their body. Fourthly, I address the issue of Besitzergreifung: I investigate what one actually possesses when one comes into possession of a thing. Fifthly, I deal with the problem of Besitznahme, that is, how it is possible to come into possession of something.