Rational agents possess a rational appetite or will, and in virtue of this will they are inclined toward goodness inherent to objects; persons are simply attracted to goodness. Now, the goodness or value inherent to a thing may be gauged in terms of the completeness of its nature, as I argued on Leibniz’s behalf in the previous chapter, and so a created thing is good (or good to degree x, y, or whatever) in virtue of what it is rather than the relation it stands to something else. During Leibniz’s time, another influential position held to a different sort of view on the nature of value: according to this position, goodness resides in God’s will, and this will is so mighty that goodness itself is dependent upon it. As I defined it in Chap. 4 : created things are secondarily (rather than primarily) good only to the extent that they are extrinsically related to, or are measured against the dictates of, the divine will. Call this position Theological Voluntarism (TV). Throughout his career Leibniz was in passionate opposition to this view, and as I shall argue, a detailed examination of his many and varied criticisms offers further clues to sharpen the Leibnizian theory of value lying in the background. Once appreciated, we gain an even better understanding of God’s choice of this, the best of all possible worlds.