For as prominent a role that it plays in his system, it is a strange realization that on his own terms justice may not even be a perfection. Goodness and wisdom and power, yes, but not justice. Perhaps, should we wish to extend the boundaries of the term, expand the concept of perfection to include almost any old good-making feature of a rational substance, then we might reckon that justice sneaks into the pantheon along with (say) compassion or steadfastness or even efficiency. Nevertheless, for Leibniz it is not a basic or primitive perfection because it is decomposable into even more basic constituent perfections, namely wisdom and charity. Justice is charity conformed to wisdom, a benevolent concern for other agents which, depending upon circumstances, may be broadened or tempered in light of practical insight. For Leibniz justice exists along a continuum, from strict right (e.g., refraining from harming another) to compassionate or merciful generosity (e.g., giving to those who are without). No matter the situation, the operative activity of the just man is to treat other human beings in the way that their dignity or perfection demands. Though he does not use the phrase himself, we may be reminded of St Thomas’s differentiation between the love of friendship on the one hand and justice on the other: when we embrace another with friendship love, we love her as another self, while when our aim is to treat another justly we love her precisely as other.