The introduction accounts both for the significance of the Tito-Stalin split and for certain problems in its explanation. For example, the conflict impacted the political development of Eastern Europe and the possibility of “pluralistic” communism through the purge of communists accused of “Titoism.” The 1955 “reconciliation” between Tito and Khrushchev never settled substantive differences among Belgrade, Moscow, and the “socialist bloc,” aggravated by Khrushchev’s drive towards “destalinization.” Internal conflicts were violently exposed by Soviet intervention in Hungary and its consequences. Many authors have addressed the split, including Adam Ulam, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Vladimir Dedijer, Ivo Banac, and more recently, Svetozar Rajak and Jeronim Perović. Each emphasizes a particular aspect of the subject. The approach of this book is to explain its importance through J. David Singer’s “level of analysis” method, that is, at subnational, national, and international levels in support of the goals of description and explanation. Besides, the Tito-Stalin split structured the Cold War in creating a particular status for Yugoslavia that it could not have had as a member of the socialist bloc. The balance of the introduction provides an overview of each contributor, their institutional affiliation, and major aspects of each chapter. Recently declassified documents indicated that the Cominform was broached to Tito before a vigorous American response in the emerging Cold War. Tito’s “error” was to presume that the Cominform was intended to alter in any way Stalin’s strictly unilateral approach to each socialist state.