This chapter offers an in-depth discussion of the HUSSS (Hard, Unstable, Self-Serving Stalemate) concept as a new framework to explain negotiation collapse in deadlock scenarios. It is argued that a deadlock under HUSSS conditions—characterized by hard polarization, unstable fragmentation, and self-serving profiteering—significantly increases the likelihood of negotiation failure. Borrowing from fields of study beyond conflict management, such as political science and international affairs, the chapter expands on these three variables, to be applied to the Venezuelan case in the chapters that follow, and their relation to negotiation collapse. It also positions HUSSS as a contrast to the concept of ripeness and as a spinoff concept to the 5S (Soft, Stable, Self-Serving Stalemate) model in negotiations, offering an alternative perspective to study complex negotiation scenarios, when traditional conflict resolution approaches may fall short. HUSSS becomes particularly useful in the case of non-traditional crises such as the Venezuelan, in which diverse root causes, both traditional and non-state powers, and international and domestic actors are intricately intertwined.