Of South Africa’sAfrica three core networkTransport industriesNetwork industries, the airport industry has historically attracted the least attention in public discourse attributable to the absence of public consultations and the fact that it is not treated as a utility like electricity. Aviation is generally associated with the wealthy classes. Yet beneath this relative quietude lies a complex regulatory structure, where a single dominant operator—ACSAAirport Company South Africa (ACSA)—manages most of the country’s commercial airports. The industry reflects all the elements of a regulatory stateRegulatory state under weak institutional arrangements, overlappingOverlap (overlapping) roles, regulator-politicalPolitical economy misalignment in infrastructureInfrastructure decisions, and a model of price regulation that is difficult to implement. As in the other two industry cases, this Chapter explores how the institutional design, and the resulting overlaps, has enabled the introduction of infrastructure programmes that have increased the costs for the airlines and the users.

错误:搜索内容不能为空,请输入英文关键词
错误:关键词超出字数限制,请精简
高级检索

Transport and Airports—The Political Economy of Airport Infrastructure Regulation

  • Robert Nkuna

摘要

Of South Africa’sAfrica three core networkTransport industriesNetwork industries, the airport industry has historically attracted the least attention in public discourse attributable to the absence of public consultations and the fact that it is not treated as a utility like electricity. Aviation is generally associated with the wealthy classes. Yet beneath this relative quietude lies a complex regulatory structure, where a single dominant operator—ACSAAirport Company South Africa (ACSA)—manages most of the country’s commercial airports. The industry reflects all the elements of a regulatory stateRegulatory state under weak institutional arrangements, overlappingOverlap (overlapping) roles, regulator-politicalPolitical economy misalignment in infrastructureInfrastructure decisions, and a model of price regulation that is difficult to implement. As in the other two industry cases, this Chapter explores how the institutional design, and the resulting overlaps, has enabled the introduction of infrastructure programmes that have increased the costs for the airlines and the users.