In the context of agricultural enterprise reform and the gradual marketization of property rights systems, the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) has emerged as a long-term incentive mechanism to enhance governance structure and motivate employees. This paper constructs a dynamic three-player game model involving controlling shareholders, management, and employees to systematically analyze how ESOP implementation affects stakeholder behavior and enterprise value. The study reveals that: (1) there exists a critical equity threshold above which employees are incentivized to exert maximum effort; (2) controlling shareholders’ opportunistic behavior depends on the alliance cost and reputational consequences; (3) when the cost of coalition is lower than the value loss, management and employees are likely to form a strategic alliance to counterbalance ownership dominance; (4) contract sustainability relies on time consistency and repeated game structures. Theoretical findings are supported by function-based derivation and game flow visualizations. The paper offers both theoretical insight and policy recommendations for the effective design and monitoring of ESOPs in agricultural enterprises.