This pivotal chapter continues the theme of examining Frege’s theses in their context. This time it is the equipollence thesis that is under examination, and I begin by showing that existing analyses of the thesis are at odds with the text. I argue that the context makes clear that the equipollence thesis is a midway point in an argument towards recognising the means natural language possesses to indicate truth: assertoric force. Within that context, an alternative analysis of ‘it is true that A’ presents itself, one that connects the equipollence thesis both with the preceding argument (The Treadmill) and the ensuing conclusion regarding assertoric force. Once done, I turn to examine ‘it is false that A’. By piecing together claims Frege makes elsewhere, predominantly in Negation, I argue there is much crossover between what he believes about ‘is true’ and what he believes about ‘is false’. I then apply the lessons learned to the perennial question of whether Frege was a truth deflationist, arguing that he is not. Finally, I consider the issue of reference failure, given my suggested analysis of ‘it is true that A’ and the context within which the equipollence thesis is put forward.