This study analyses accident rates in the Navy from the perspective of operational safety. Accident investigation is essential to identify their root causes and to implement preventive measures that can help avoid similar events in the future. This is particularly critical in the Navy, as evidenced by the fact that it had its own Occupational Risk Prevention Management System well before the enactment of Law 31/1995 of November 8, which regulates this field. This system was known as “Operational Safety” (SEGOP) (BOE 10/11/1995), defined as the set of techniques aimed at reducing and preventing risks (González Fuentes, 2014). Law 31/1995 marked a turning point in the development of Operational Safety in the Navy, initiating a process of aligning Navy doctrine with occupational risk prevention standards. This culminated in 2001 with the first publication on Operational Safety in Naval Installations. Later, Royal Decree 1755/2007 of December 28 was enacted, addressing occupational risk prevention for military personnel in the Armed Forces and the organization of prevention services within the Ministry of Defense (BOE 18/01/2008). On February 7, 2011, the Navy published its General Plan for Occupational Risk Prevention (PG-PRL/SEGOP), adapting Law 31/1995 to the Navy’s specific operational context. The analysis of prevention in the Armed Forces is particularly complex, given the size of its personnel, the diversity of installations, and the unique characteristics of naval vessels (Miranda, 2022).