In this chapter, I address the role of political ideology and collective emotions in the making of a diagnosis in mental health, underlining how, particularly in the realm of mental health and social deviance, diagnosis has historically functioned as a significant tool for social and political control. By categorizing certain behaviours, conditions, or individuals as pathological, diagnosis may serve to define the boundaries of normalcy and regulate conformity to societal norms. To reach this aim, I am going to discuss some philosophical principles and show how they are usually taken for granted in psychiatry. This chapter is articulated in three main parts: in the first one, I discuss the relationship between psychiatry and social values, both considering some historical examples and the contemporary scenario. In the second part, I stress the role of collective emotions as tools possessing the capacity to influence diagnostic processes, underlining the circular causality between them and the making of a diagnosis: collective emotions not only influence the ascertainment of a mental health disorder but also diagnoses can reinforce specific collective emotions. In the third part, I will consider the history of the Asperger diagnosis, a paradigmatic case of this dialectical tension between collective emotions, social values, and pathology. At the core of this contribution lies the belief that health and illness may be seen not only as physiological conditions but also as social constructs that mirror certain social values embedded in a society in a specific time frame.

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Political Ideology, Collective Emotions and Diagnosis in Psychiatry

  • Francesca Brencio

摘要

In this chapter, I address the role of political ideology and collective emotions in the making of a diagnosis in mental health, underlining how, particularly in the realm of mental health and social deviance, diagnosis has historically functioned as a significant tool for social and political control. By categorizing certain behaviours, conditions, or individuals as pathological, diagnosis may serve to define the boundaries of normalcy and regulate conformity to societal norms. To reach this aim, I am going to discuss some philosophical principles and show how they are usually taken for granted in psychiatry. This chapter is articulated in three main parts: in the first one, I discuss the relationship between psychiatry and social values, both considering some historical examples and the contemporary scenario. In the second part, I stress the role of collective emotions as tools possessing the capacity to influence diagnostic processes, underlining the circular causality between them and the making of a diagnosis: collective emotions not only influence the ascertainment of a mental health disorder but also diagnoses can reinforce specific collective emotions. In the third part, I will consider the history of the Asperger diagnosis, a paradigmatic case of this dialectical tension between collective emotions, social values, and pathology. At the core of this contribution lies the belief that health and illness may be seen not only as physiological conditions but also as social constructs that mirror certain social values embedded in a society in a specific time frame.