The ideal of the autonomous knower—characterized by self-reliance and first-hand knowledge acquisition—has been celebrated as a hallmark of epistemic excellence. However, this emphasis has faced critiques from social and virtue epistemologists, who highlight the inherently social nature of human inquiry. Despite these critiques, contemporary discourse continues to privilege intellectual autonomy to some extent, associating epistemic agency with the independent acquisition of knowledge and attributing epistemic superiority to such endeavors. This chapter challenges this prevailing assumption by introducing the concept of “intellectual receptivity” as a critical yet undervalued epistemic good. Drawing insights on receptivity from care ethics, this chapter argues that intellectual receptivity offers a vital counterbalance to the overemphasis on intellectual autonomy. The analysis underscores the importance of intellectual virtues such as open-mindedness, humility, and epistemic justice, demonstrating their indispensability for intellectual flourishing. By addressing the tension between the value of intellectual autonomy and the significance of testimonial knowledge, this chapter positions intellectual receptivity as a foundational epistemic good for a more balanced and inclusive understanding of epistemic agency. Although care ethicists briefly acknowledge intellectual receptivity, they do not examine its relation to reliance on testimony or to other intellectual character traits in detail. The account of intellectual receptivity developed in this chapter may, in turn, prove significant for moral considerations and thereby enhance our understanding of receptivity within the ethics of care.