The hold that the will is supposed to exercise on some human behavior has always been feeble: though authors like HumeHume, David stated that we are free whenever we act in accordance with our intentions (that is, spontaneously), Kant has argued that such appeal to intentions is a wretched subterfuge—what we want or will is no less determined by previous factors, and ultimately factors well beyond the scope of our lives, than what else we do. As an alternative to such chicanery, he developed his own brand of compatibilism: a behavior is autonomous if, in addition to being determined by natural causes (which it always is), it is also rational, and hence reason in us can appropriate it and declare it a manifestation of itself. Despite the uninformed, tendentious readings “scholars” have offered for the so-called “formula of humanity,” rationality cannot be limited within Kant’s position to members of the species homo sapiens: animals, plants, and machines can also display it, and hence be attributed a free will (Kantian Wille). Turning now to the more modest display of intentions, in a Humean vein, they too cannot be limited to humans: Freud has provided ample evidence that our intentions (and even his own) typically escape the subject’s consciousness and are best seen by an outside observer. So I can attribute intentions to a machine with as much legitimacy as I do to a human, and what that human judges (from the “inside”) to be his intentions is as much conjectural and uncertain as my (external) hypotheses are.