On both sides of the analytic/continental divide, consciousness has enjoyed an exalted status, foundational for a world of its own or even for the world, period. On the contrary, I have a deflationary view of it: for me, a behavior X (and its subject) is (are) conscious/aware of another behavior Y (which may be identical with X) when it contains traces of Y—when Y is present, however slightly, within X—and X shows signs of reacting to it. Therefore, consciousness is all over: in animate and inanimate things, in plants, animals, and machines, as well as in human beings. And it goes with varying degrees of attention: from one that is focused to one that is peripheral, to one that is even blocked by forces internal to a subject. The Freudian distinction between what is conscious, preconscious, and unconscious finds its place here; but note that what is unconscious in this sense is still conscious in mine—it still has effect on one’s behavior. Self-consciousness is consciousness of oneself, and its function is that of calling to attention all of a subject’s resources in a situation that is perceived as dangerous. As such, it has none of the features DescartesDescartes, René attributes to it: it is not transparent, veridical, or privileged, since someone else can have better access to the reality of my situation than I do; and it is not continuous—it lasts as long as the situation is perceived as dangerous, and then fades. The delusion of a Cartesian (self-)consciousness is instigated by public powers, which feel threatened by the private sphere and hence insinuate there their own agent, ready to report on anything subversive going on (as the guard in Bentham’s panopticon) and, to seal the deal, identified by the subject being spied on with its own most intimate nature. The duality consciousness/conscience hides the controlling role exercised by (self-)consciousness (apparent in Romance languages, where no such duality exists); though this role may turn out to have positive consequences if it works not in favor of oppressive political or social regimes but in favor of (Kantian, rational) ethics.