As yet incapable of grasping the complex, qualitative(!), unobservable dimensions and nuances, the ambiguities and contradictions of the Human and the Vital, we avoid thinking about (or “taking care of”) the socio-cultural construction of the Person and the Citizen, about a truly systemic and long-term change which can only originate and flow from below. The issue, as always, is educational and cultural: we have not learned to relinquish our decrepit myths, rooted in the erroneous view that still confuses complicated systems with complex systems, mechanisms with organisms. Thought, which requires time and a capacity for abstraction, makes us slow and inefficient, whereas with the aim of becoming “perfect” (machines?)—we are staking everything on (hyper)velocity and on processes of simulation and automation. The objectives, openly declared, are to “instruct” (aha!) and train people to be hyper-specialised technicians and mere executors of functions and rules. Having severed thought, we fall into Arendt’s vision of humanity enslaved by its own know-how, at the mercy of any technologically possible device, even the most ferocious. Meanwhile, with the advent and progressive tuning of artificial intelligence, a complex synthesis between man and machine, whose implications we cannot foresee, may create a new epistemological fracture.

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Thought and Thinking in the Hypertechnological Civilization of Automation and Simulation: Artificial Intelligence as a “New Epistemological Fracture”

  • Piero Dominici

摘要

As yet incapable of grasping the complex, qualitative(!), unobservable dimensions and nuances, the ambiguities and contradictions of the Human and the Vital, we avoid thinking about (or “taking care of”) the socio-cultural construction of the Person and the Citizen, about a truly systemic and long-term change which can only originate and flow from below. The issue, as always, is educational and cultural: we have not learned to relinquish our decrepit myths, rooted in the erroneous view that still confuses complicated systems with complex systems, mechanisms with organisms. Thought, which requires time and a capacity for abstraction, makes us slow and inefficient, whereas with the aim of becoming “perfect” (machines?)—we are staking everything on (hyper)velocity and on processes of simulation and automation. The objectives, openly declared, are to “instruct” (aha!) and train people to be hyper-specialised technicians and mere executors of functions and rules. Having severed thought, we fall into Arendt’s vision of humanity enslaved by its own know-how, at the mercy of any technologically possible device, even the most ferocious. Meanwhile, with the advent and progressive tuning of artificial intelligence, a complex synthesis between man and machine, whose implications we cannot foresee, may create a new epistemological fracture.