In this chapter, I explain the relationships between the notions of justification, epistemic verisimilitude, and truth. Epistemic verisimilitude cannot be reduced or replaced by the notion of justification, although no theory has epistemic verisimilitude if it is not first agreed that it is well-justified. I provide an analysis of the notion of justification in which it is apparent why justification falls short of what is required to epistemologically describe and evaluate our scientific theories. In addition, epistemic verisimilitude cannot be equated with either truth or approximation to truth since our theories can possess epistemic verisimilitude without knowing they are true or are approaching truth. Nevertheless, truth is still a relevant notion in epistemology and the philosophy of science. As such, the notion of epistemic verisimilitude is neither a deflationary concept, like justification, nor an inflationary one, like truth. I also propose an explanation for why the notion of truth in the philosophy of science has been subject to so much criticism and controversy. To do this, I offer a genealogical, common-sense account of the notion of truth and claim that there has been a shift in its application from its everyday uses to its use in the philosophy of science, where the concept lacks some relevant characteristics that control its relatively uncontroversial normal uses. This is problematic and causes unnecessary problems.