With the extended argument that I have developed in this book as the necessary background for reflection, I analyse realism’s and anti-realism’s main insights. The incursion into the realist headquarters includes a critical review of the optimistic meta-induction in Philip Kitcher’s version of realism and Hilary Putnam’s no-miracles argument. In the anti-realist headquarters, I dissect the pessimistic meta-induction in its more widespread and popular form, Putnam’s more sophisticated version of it and his attempt to overcome it, Larry Laudan’s multilayer anti-realist arguments, Bas van Fraassen’s bad lot argument and, finally, P. Kyle Stanford’s argument for unconceived alternatives. I show that neither realism nor anti-realism has good resources to challenge the view that I have defended regarding theory change in the natural sciences and how we should epistemologically assess their results—namely, as a vulnerable increase in their epistemic verisimilitude. Along the way, I highlight the main virtues and flaws of realism and anti-realism.