In this paper I discuss three assertions, which are sometimes taken for granted: l. Russell did not understand Gödel’s celebrated results, which he interpreted as implying that arithmetic is inconsistent, and also as new “puzzles” to be solved through the theory of types; 2. Russell was unable to handle the distinction between theory and metatheory, and 3. Russell’s logicism collapsed after Gödel’s incompleteness results. By taking into consideration relevant—published and unpublished—materials, I will show that the three assertions are either false or considerably open to doubt (Due to limitations of space in these Proceedings, I was forced to delete the first section of the original paper, as it was actually read. That section dealt with the reasons why Russell never published a reply to Gödel’s contribution to Schilpp, P. 1944 (ed.) The philosophy o/ Bertrand Russell. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1971. [That section now recovered as Chap. 3 of this volume].).